Risk-based equity requirements: how equity rules for the financial sector can be applied to the real economy Handschin 
Equity

Equity as risk reserve
Equity is the difference-amount between the debts and the assets of the company. If the company were to sell all assets and pay back all liabilities, the remaining value 1 would belong to the shareholders. The function of equity is thus to provide33 a buffer or a reserve to cope with corporate risks; essentially safeguarding creditors' claims 2 . Therefore, the term 'risk reserve' 3 is an appropriate and preferable description of the function of equity. Equity is the amount which the company should not distribute to the shareholders in view of the risk that the claims of creditors are not safeguarded. 4 The primary risk that can be controlled by equity is the risk of asset reduction. The reduction of assets and increase of liabilities can result for numerous reasons: cash-drain, new liabilities and the revaluation of assets and liabilities. The revaluation of assets can become necessary to compensate for their aging (and corresponding loss of value), 5 a sudden loss in value due to a damage or destruction of the asset; bankruptcy or bankruptcy-risk of creditors; or changed market conditions. 4 John Armour, 'Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?', 7 EBOR (2006) at p. 10: 'there may clearly be benefits to imposing dividend constrains based on net asset values', i.e. on real equity; Rickfolrd Report (fn. 2) at p. 44: 'in what conditions is it legitimate, in the cause of creditor protection, to restrict a company's freedom to pay a return to its shareholders?'. Also see European Court of Justice [ECJ] , Case 212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen [1999] 2 CMLR 551, at pp. 586 et seq. 5 'Depreciation is the systematic allocation of the depreciable amount of an asset over its useful life.' (IAS 16.6, 38.8). 'An entity shall assess at each reporting date whether there is any indication that an asset may be impaired. If any such indication exists, the entity shall estimate the recoverable amount of the asset.' (IAS 36.9). 'Depreciation is a systematic and rational process of distributing the cost of tangible assets over the life of assets.' (US GAAP Accounting Research Bulletin [ARB] No. 43, chapter 9C para. 5).
Real equity and nominal equity
Assets and liabilities always have two values: a book value and a real value. The real value of assets and liabilities may deviate from their book value due to accounting rules; due to changes which lead to a reassessment of the company's assets; or because the company has made a mistake when assessing the value of the said asset. 6 The equity which is derived from book values can be called the nominal equity. It can be directly taken from the balance sheet and consists of the statutory or legal capital, the free, accounting and legal reserves and accrued profits. The nominal equity is the sum resulting from the deduction of the nominal value of the liabilities from the nominal value of the assets of a company. 7 Similarly, the equity which is derived from real values can be called the real equity. Consequently, the real equity is the sum resulting from the deduction of the real value of the liabilities from the real value of the assets of a company.
If we relate these definitions to the function of equity as a reserve to account for the company's financial risks, it is apparent that as much as liabilities and risks are real, not nominal, the relevant figure must be the real equity, not the nominal equity. Therefore, to define the equity related to the risk bearing ability of a company we have to refer to the real value of assets and liabilities, not to their book value. 8
1.2.1
Overvalued assets and their impact on equity 6 Ross, Westerfield, Jordan (fn. 1) at pp. 23 et seq. 7 See also Armour (fn.4) at p. 10: 'there may clearly be benefits to imposing dividend constrains based on net asset values', i.e. on real equity. 8 Cf. Rickford Report (fn. 2) at p. 943: the Rickford Report questions the concept of equity in principle, based on the (correct) assessment that nominal equity alone cannot safeguard the rights of creditors.
If the book value of the assets exceeds the real value, the real equity is reduced. In these situations the real equity is smaller than the nominal equity. If the nominal equity is smaller than the difference between the real value of the liabilities and the real value of the assets of a company, the real equity is no longer sufficient to cover the liabilities.
As a consequence the nominal equity should be determined in such a way that the real equity remains sufficient to cover liabilities and risks. The gap between nominal and real equity depends on the reliability of the valuation of assets and liabilities; that is precisely on the risk that assets are valued to high and liabilities to low. There is a correlation between the valuation risk and equity; the larger the risk of false valuations (overvaluation in case of assets; undervaluation in case of liabilities), the more nominal equity is needed to close the gap between the nominal equity and the real equity.
One of the functions of nominal equity is thus to close this gap. It is imperative that the nominal equity is sufficient to cover the liabilities of the company, even if it turns out that the valuation of assets and liabilities was too high or too low, respectively. Where the reliability of the asset valuation is questionable, the nominal equity must exceed the (assumed) real equity to cover the revaluation risk.
Hidden reserves and revaluation reserves (valuation surplus) and their impact on equity
In part, these (undervaluation-) risks are covered by accounting rules. In civil law accounting and to a certain extent in US GAAP the risk of asset revaluation is reduced by valuation rules which focus on prudence, rather than on a true and fair valuation. For instance, according to the rules of the commercial codes of most civil law countries and under US GAAP 9 (also as an option in IFRS 10 ), fixed assets can only be valued at their production or purchase value after the necessary depreciations have been made. Value increases of fixed assets after the purchase are, as a rule, not possible. If assets valued at production or purchase value actually increase in value over subsequent years (as could be the case with real estate for example) the real value of the asset will be higher than its book value. This difference in amount (spread) are 'hidden reserves'. Hidden reserves reduce the (nominal) amount of assets, consequently lessening the risk of value reductions. In the legal doctrine of civil law countries hidden reserves are justified as a possibility to reduce the revaluation risk.
11
If a company holds assets with a book value above the real value (overvalued assets) and other assets with a real value which is higher than the book value (hidden reserves), hidden reserves can compensate for overvalued assets. This shows that hidden reserves reduce the effect of overvalued assets; they are -in fact -equity.
12
True and fair accounting rules make more use of the full valuation potential of assets and allow a revaluation of assets, where an asset has increased in value. Some accounting rules demand that the difference between the initial and the new value of the asset is not booked as profit, but instead must be allocated to a specific revaluation reserve or surplus. This is re- quired by the IFRS and partly under US GAAP for certain assets, for example: property, plant and equipment, 13 intangible assets, 14 investment property, 15 available for sale securities 16 .
17
As a result, the (hidden) equity (of civil law accounting), arising from the undervalued asset, is made transparent (by true and fair accounting rules) by increasing both the value of the asset and the (nominal) equity (revaluation surplus) in order to cover the valuation risk. Revaluation reserves are accounting reserves designed to cover the revaluation risk of an asset. These rules specify and confirm the general principle that valuation risks have to be covered by increased equity. 
Equity and asset revaluation risks
True and fair accounting valuations have increased the vulnerability of the valuation of assets.
This is the case as in many situations they allow the value of an asset to be based on capital- 13 'If an asset's carrying amount is increased as a result of a revaluation, the increase shall be credited directly to equity under the heading of revaluation surplus. However, the increase shall be recognized in profit or loss to the extent that it reverses a revaluation decrease of the same asset previously recognized in profit or loss.' (IAS 16.39). 14 'If an intangible asset's carrying amount is increased as a result of a revaluation, the increase shall be credited directly to equity under the heading of revaluation surplus. However, the increase shall be recognized in profit or loss to the extent that it reverses a revaluation decrease of the same asset previously recognized in profit or loss.' (IAS 38.85 debts. 21 The liquidity risk is the risk that for the satisfaction of a certain obligation the therefore needed asset is not at hand. In such a case the needed asset must be replaced by the liquidation of held assets or by an increase in debt.
22
In precise terms, the liquidity risk is the risk of a negative free cash flow. If a company has a negative free cash flow it has neither the operative potential nor the assets to catch up the outflow of funds through operative and investive (or rather divestive) cash flows, for example by selling fixed assets. In this situation the company depends on financing. A company with high equity in relation to the risk profile can realize this financing by itself; a company with low equity does not have this possibility. If no additional funds can be made available from the shareholders (not required by most legislations 23 ), the potential to provide for new liquidity depends entirely on the company's ability to increase debt. The ability of the company to increase debt depends on the structure and amount of pre-existing debt and assets 24 . If the asset structure is such, that it can generate liquidity easily, for example if the assets are cash itself or can be used as a collateral, the equity which is needed is different from the situation where assets cannot be converted to cash easily, for example activated research costs or any other assets without a specific market value.
To determine the necessary equity related to the liquidity risk of the company, the company first has to determine the size of the gap, or potential gap, between cash income and cash expenses. Second, it must assess the quality of the assets to determine their liquidity. ample, a specific liquidity risk of 1,000 is covered by assets, which are cash itself, then the equity could be 1,000 as well. If on the other hand the liquidity risk of 1,000 is covered by assets which can be used as collateral but only up to 50 per cent of their value, the equity to control this liquidity risk would have to be 2,000.
1.5
Equity as a reference figure for (the overall financial) risk bearing ability
In the economic literature, financial corporate risks are usually defined by a reason (external, operational, strategic) and not so much based on their implications for the balance sheets and of the amount of equity. 25 This does not change the fact that there is a direct link between equity and corporate risks. All corporate risks can be specified as either a valuations risk or a liquidity/outflow of cash risk. For example the reputation risk can only create a problem because it leads to a decrease in customers, and therefore, a decrease in incoming cash and subsequently to additional liquidity risks. The risk that the company is threatened by a lawsuit bears the risk, that the liabilities will have to be increased; and the risk that a planned technology does not work leads to the risk that activated research costs will have to be impaired.
The more questionable the valuations of assets and debts, the higher the valuation risks are, and the larger the equity should be. A company, whose assets consist of activated research costs, or, a company which takes risks which may lead to unexpected debts, needs more equity than a company which does not take any risks and whose assets consist of stable government bonds. So we can conclude that equity is the risk reserve of a company. It also follows that the universal applicability of equity as a reference figure for the overall financial risk bearing ability shows the superior function of equity in corporate law. 26 This general principle is true in both the financial and the non-financial sectors.
2.
Rules on equity in the financial sector
Substantive rules (equity requirements)
Financial market rules regarding the necessary equity-backing regulate respective equity requirements and define specific asset categories based on their inherent revaluation risk. 27 This equity regulation is eased in the financial sector due to the fact that the financial sector is, in comparison to the non-financial sector, much more homogenous in regard to the assets heldthe financial risks and the balance sheets are similar among all banks and insurance companies.
Basel III
Since the financial crisis of 2008/9 the Basel Committee has developed the concept of stronger capital buffers for banks to ensure the stability of the financial system. This will in turn improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks from financial and economic stress, and therefore, reduce the risk of a spill over from the financial sector into the real economy. Both, the increase in quantity and the increase in quality of the prescribed first-tier capital constrains approaches that banks may take to their asset structure and their risk behaviour. As a consequence banks will be forced to lower their all over risk exposure. This can be achieved by adapting the risk structure of the held assets or by building up first-tier capital.
34
The superior function of equity (in the financial sector) is acknowledged. 36 'The important issue is at what point does the probability of financial distress so increase the cost of equity and debt that it outweighs the benefit of the tax relief on debt?' Arnold (fn. 1) at pp. 569 and 578. For the function of the overall cost of capital a U-shaped relation for the equity/debt rate is postulated. However a best debt/equity ratio cannot scientifically be established. It is argued that an even significantly higher equity requirement would only limit a bank's risk structure. These findings may also hold true in the non-financial sector. However, if research would show that in fact equity is more expensive in that sense in the non-financial sector, one reason might be that companies are able to externalize some of the risk to creditors that are unable to negotiate conditions, and therefore are unable to consider the counterparties risk bearing ability. 41 The stress-testing controls risks arising from the banking and the trading book. In order to comply, the valueat-risk must withhold a simulated a one year period of continued significant financial stress. Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 3 n. 12. For implementation in the EU see Directive 2010/76/EU. 42 Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 3 n. 12, 16. 43 The countercyclical buffer controls valuation risks arising from changing economic cycles. Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 5 n. 19; for more forward looking provisions (replacement of IAS 39) at p. 6 n. 23.
exposed risks. They are tools to detect further off-balance sheet risks, 44 and thus help to make revaluation risks 45 controllable.
"Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses." 46 To strengthen the liquidity, the regulation requires sufficient high-quality liquidity resources for both a one month-47 as well as for a one year-period, based on respective stress scenarios. 48 High-quality resources are held assets that are either liquid or can be made liquid at anytime without unacceptable losses. Therefore, sufficient assets with low revaluation risks must be held in relation to outstanding obligations.
This has the effect that a strong liquidity regime also leads to a strong equity to asset riskrelationship. These safeguards, like the minimal capital requirements, are required to ensure liquidity; they are, in fact, two sides of the same coin.
Summary, preliminary conclusions
The aims and solutions of Basel III show and prove the relationship between equity and financial risks. The aim of the rules is to reduce the risk of a failure of a bank. The solution found is to define specific requirements regarding the quantity (percentage of balance sheet 44 'One of the most procyclical dynamics has been the failure of risk management and capital frameworks to capture key exposures -such as complex trading activities, resecuritisations and exposures to off-balance sheet vehicles'. Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 4 n. 20. 45 A main problem arose from the pro cyclical effects of the Basel II internal credit risk models used. European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, December 2009, at p. 149 et seq. <http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html>; Ojo (fn. 31) at p. 3. The tendency of market participants to behave in a pro cyclical manner was amongst other reasons induced by the used accounting standards for market-to-market assets and held-to-maturity loans. Regulatory Framework (fn. 28) at p. 5 n. 18. 46 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision', September 2008 at p. 1 <http://www.bis.org>. 47 The controlling instrument is the 'Liquidity Coverage Ratio'. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurements, standards and monitoring', December 2010 at p.
total) and quality of equity by using rules which require a diligent asset management and the control of risks (which relate to higher profitability) through additional equity. 49 Some national legislations have even gone beyond the Basle III equity-requirements (in some legislation primarily targeted at banks considered as too big to fail 50 ). The clear object of this move is to create a competitive advantage for their own financial market by requiring the banks to further enhance their risk bearing ability.
The quantitative and qualitative rules on equity for the financial market are very specific and refer to bank-specific risks, assets and liabilities. Such specific rules like these are possible, because the balance sheets of banks and insurance companies are similar; they are comparable and all structured in the same way.
The procedural rules, regulatory enforcement
The enforcement of substantive rules of the Basel III regulation requires close monitoring. To improve market discipline, disclosure requirements will be tightened with respect to all elements of the capital. 51 The European Central Bank has highlighted the importance of increased transparency of the financial institution's asset exposure for further financial stabil- used by the national supervisors in order to assess the liquidity risk of their banks. As specific liquidity risks may arise from different jurisdictions national supervisors will need to develop additional tools that cope with those risks. 53 These additional regulatory requirements demonstrate the link between substantive rules (on equity) and regulatory enforcement in the financial sector. 54 Regulatory enforcement of substantive rules in the financial sector was first implemented in the 1930s when the focus was on national activities. 55 Subsequently this was extended into the international dimension, first limited to international cash flows 56 and, then after the introduction of the current-account convertibility in the 1960s extended towards a comprehensive global financial regulation. 57 Although there was a broad international consensus that free markets are beneficial for economic growth and that free capital markets lead to a more efficient allocation of capital, the ambiguity of this relationship 58 and the danger of pushing markets to poorly regulated offshore centres showed the necessity for additional regulation. This was implemented by the Basel accords, standards and guidelines, which are legally non- 53 Framework for Liquidity Risk (fn. 47) at p. 31 n. 138. 54 National supervisors reliance on external auditors' expertise has increased. As most supervisors increasingly rely on audit to complement supervisory processes, the issue of transparency at the level of the audited banks and the audit firms, is of significant concern for effective supervision . Furthermore, high standards in audit enhance market confidence, particularly in times of financial distress. Other concerns arise at the level of the audit firms. 61 Even in countries which emphasize the free market such as the United States, the United Kingdom and also Switzerland, the need for strict banking regulations are undisputed given the specific risks arising from the financial sector to the general economy.
3.
Rules on equity in the non-financial sector (in selected legislations) 
Minimal Capital requirements
Provisions for future risks?
In traditional civil law bookkeeping it is permissible to create provisions for future risks and in contemplation of future investments. Such provisions are hidden reserves and therefore, not compliant with true and fair bookkeeping according to IFRS standards. According to true and fair bookkeeping rules provisions can only be formed for uncertain future asset-reductions resulting from past events though not for future risks and investments. 72 Similar rules allowing provisions for future risks exist under US GAAP. 73 In part these rules compensate impairment rules which allow a revaluation of assets only if the loss is not recoverable. This broader understanding of provisions in civil law bookkeeping and US GAAP is consistent 66 Whether the legal capital of, eg Euro 37,000 for other public companies (France, CCom. Art. L-224-2) or Euro 50,000 (Germany, AktG § 7) is an entry barrier to an own company respectively a negative economic stimulant is to be challenged. The reduction of tax and bureaucratic hurdles related to the set-up and the operation of a company would probably be more effectual. 67 with the concept of equity as risk reserve, as it creates equity with regard to future financial risks.
3.3
Valuation rules; creation of additional equity if going concern ability is in peril Accounting valuation rules allow for the valuing of assets and liabilities based on the going concern assumption. "Under the going concern assumption, an entity is viewed as continuing in business for the foreseeable future. General purpose financial statements are prepared on a going concern basis, unless management either intends to liquidate the entity or to cease operations, or has no realistic alternative but to do so." 74 This means that assets will have to be revalued at their liquidation value, and additional liabilities (reserves) might have to be created to cover the additional risks deriving from the endangered going concern ability. Provisions to cover liquidation costs have to be made, etc.
The reduction of the value of assets to the liquidation value has the same effect on the balance sheet and the nominal equity as is seen by the creation of hidden reserves. First, this reduces the distributable profit and creates additional real equity to cover the risks related to the endangered going concern ability. In a well-capitalized company this reduces the potential to distribute profits, but creates no risks for the creditors. In a weakly capitalized company this reduction of the nominal equity (by the allocation of real equity to cover the risks deriving from the endangered going concern ability) forces the company to change its risk behaviour to the new situation and necessitates additional equity which would have to be provided for by the shareholders. If they refuse to recapitalize the company and the remaining equity is insufficient to continue the operations, the management has to try to liquidate the company before 74 'Going Concern Assumption' IAS 570.
creditors are harmed. The rules regarding the valuation of assets and liabilities if the going concern ability is in peril are rules, which, in a specific risk situation, require additional equity or a new risk profile.
Second Company Law Directive
The 
Rickford Report
The concept of a static and formalistic equity requirement for corporation has to be questioned given its inflexibility and also due to the fact that reality is much too complex for such 79 Art. 22 (1) (b). 80 Art. 32 (1) as amended by Directive 2006/68/EC: 'In the event of a reduction in the subscribed capital, at least the creditors whose claims antedate the publication of the decision on the reduction shall at least have the right to obtain security for claims which have not fallen due by the date of that publication. Member States may not set aside such a right unless the creditor has adequate safeguards, or unless such safeguards are not necessary having regard to the assets of the company. Member States shall lay down the conditions for the exercise of the right provided for in the first subparagraph. In any event, Member States shall ensure that the creditors are authorised to apply to the appropriate administrative or judicial authority for adequate safeguards provided that they can credibly demonstrate that due to the reduction in the subscribed capital the satisfaction of their claims is at stake, and that no adequate safeguards have been obtained from the company.' Art. 32 (2) 'The laws of the Member States shall also stipulate at least that the reduction shall be void or that no payment may be made for the benefit of the shareholders, until the creditors have obtained satisfaction or a court has decided that their application should not be acceded to.' Art. 32 (3) 'This Article shall apply where the reduction in the subscribed capital is brought about by the total or partial waiving of the payment of the balance of the shareholders' contributions.' 81 'Earned surplus test' under Art. 15 (1) (c).
simplistically structured rules. It is said, that these rules cannot satisfy the purpose of the protection of shareholders, creditors and the company 82 and instead a scheme is suggested that allows payments to shareholders whenever a balance sheet test shows no over indebtedness and a solvency test the going concern ability of the company.
83
The solvency test requires a procedure to affirm that distributions to shareholders do not further the risk of insolvency. The solvency-test in the United Kingdom allows the distribution of dividends as long as the solvency (with reasonable ex ante sight) seems given for another year. 84 The New Zealand approach differs somewhat. There, the solvency test is "whether the company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business; and the value of the company's assets is greater than the value of its liabilities, including contingent liabilities." 85 Furthermore directors are required to "sign a certificate stating that, in their opinion, the company will, immediately after the distribution, satisfy the solvency test and the grounds for that opinion."
86
The weakness of the solvency test is that it focuses on liquidity and that the asset valuation risks are addressed only indirectly. 87 A solvency test relies on the board's subjective assessment of future outlooks, and therefore, cannot assure objective values of the underlying valuations. 88 As the solvency test relies more on the capacity of the company to pay its debts, and not on a balance-sheet over indebtedness, future income can be considered in this test, in the same way it is included in a liquidity test. 89 For this reason the Rickford Report proposes as second test, a bare balance sheet net asset test, which focuses on the balance sheet, not on solvency, but without any equity-barriers regarding distributions to shareholders. 90 However, one of the main weaknesses of the balance sheet test is that it lacks the ability to detect off balance sheet liabilities. As the assets shown on the balance sheet are book values and not real values it is reasoned that the application of any balance sheet test should not be too rigid.
91
Distributions made on the basis of a balance sheet test alone or in combination with a solvency test thus fail to preserve the needed equity in relation to the risk bearing ability of the company. The more the book value diverges from the real value of an asset, the lower the protection of adequate equity by a balance sheet test becomes.
Critical remarks
The concepts described in the Rickford Report imply a perfectly correct valuation of assets.
They ignore the risk of false valuations and the risk (even if all valuations were correct) that the valuation basis may change, as well as the fact that the accounting-valuation rules do not cover these risks. As a minimum those risks, which the accounting rules do not cover, should be controlled by equity.
A system which protects only the diligent and 'market-mighty' creditors cannot be justified and is naive. 92 These are the very creditors who are in a position to calculate their own investment risk 93 and behave accordingly (for example, by only giving credit against collateral). Such creditors are, in fact, not in need of protection at all. A system of that kind protects the interests of these groups at the cost of weaker and less professional creditors, such as trade creditors and small subcontractors, who lack bargaining and informational resources 94 Furthermore it is at the expense of tort creditors, 95 who by definition do not negotiate collateral before 'giving credit' to the tortfeasor.
Duties of the board of directors regarding the financial risk bearing ability
The relationship between equity and risk bearing ability is accepted in the legislation of many jurisdictions. These equity related rules are -however -not set up to define the necessary amount of equity. They are embedded in the general liability rules for the board of directors 96 and are applied if the risk behaviour of the board is not in line with the equity-driven risk bearing ability of the company.
97
In the legislation of both civil and common law jurisdictions there is broad agreement that rules are necessary in order to maintain a sufficient equity level, be this by way of a liquidity or solvency-test, a balance sheet test, or through rules on capital protection. Only under "laboratory conditions" in a perfectly functioning market, where every participant is perfectly informed and in a position to freely adjust, are no rules for capital maintenance needed whatsoever. In the real world we must assume that some creditors have neither the information nor the ability to adjust, and are therefore exposed to the externalisation of risks and costs by companies and certain creditors. 98 Further creditors capable of adjusting often subject their loan to conditions that impede the company's ability to engage in transactions that would increase the risk for the creditor, therefore "there are potentially significant savings to be made through company law providing 'creditor terms' which restrict such transactions."
99
In jurisdictions which follow the English lead, the West Mercia line of cases requires directors to consider the risk of insolvency at any given time. Where a threat of insolvency is significant, directors are bound to make greater provisions in order to protect creditors at the expense of shareholders. The protection required varies in relation to the severity of the threat. 100 In the United Kingdom, as well as in the United States, the majority holds as a con- to the company and not in regard to the creditors themselves. It is argued that the wrongful trading provision 102 addresses the issue of creditor protection, and thus, there is no need to treat creditors 'as if they were shareholders' 103 . In continental Europe a more pluralistic, or better, consolidated approach is widely accepted. 104 As the board forms the will of the company as a legal entity and acts on behalf of the company, it is obliged to safeguard the interests arising out of contractual relationships between the company and third parties as well as those arising out of tort.
In US case law and doctrine it has also been upheld that there is a duty of the directors to- tionally the lex pauliana and the wrongful trading provision (under admissible possible interpretation) imply the duty of the board to constantly assess the going concern ability and the risk exposure of the company at any point in time, and furthermore to act accordingly.
In a very general way we can therefore conclude that certainly in civil law jurisdictions, and (at least) arguably in the common law environment, there is a general duty of the board of directors to respect the financial risk bearing ability of the company. This financial risk bearing ability means that the company should only take on risks which it can bear based on its financial structure: that the necessary funds are at hand to execute the planned activities, and, in particular, the necessary liquidity is available to meet due obligations. The financial risk ability is related to the equity of the company. A company with a low equity may not have the risk bearing ability to conduct a specific business where there is a risk money may be lost. It is also worth noting that the structure of assets in a company with low equity is less flexible.
As a general rule it can be said that the higher the risks taken, the greater the equity required. 117 The board of directors is obliged to assess the risks of planned and effected operation (risk assessment) and act accordingly (risk management) 118 and not permit the engaging in any business, if it is thought that the company lacks the financial resources to conduct such business. from the comparative analysis the conclusion is drawn that the duties that arise in these legislations in the vicinity of insolvency 'are measures that are designed to be taken before it is too late, i.e. before the company is insolvent.' Hence, these duties also imply a duty to monitor the risk baring ability.
Both elements of this rule (risk profile and financial resources/equity 120 ) are adjustable: if the equity is too low for aspired risk profile, either the equity or the risk profile has to be adjusted.
For this reason, the rules regarding the financial risk bearing ability of the board are rules on equity. 
Practical reasons; non-financial market sector is too heterogeneous
The most important reason for different legislative approaches to equity regulation in the financial and non-financial sectors is a practical reason: the non-financial sector is comparatively much more complex. This statement may come as a surprise as bank balance sheets are "notoriously more opaque than those of generic firms". 122 In the case of banks the valuation of each asset is more difficult, e.g. the valuation of a credit requires the analysis of the respective creditor etc. 123 So, a bank's balance sheet is difficult to evaluate, but its easy to regulate, since we have a defined catalogue of asset categories. The opposite holds true in the real economy: Even if specific assets might be easier to value, 124 the balance sheet structure of each company in the real economy is unique. It is not possible to define groups of specific companies and asset categories, and to then determine specific asset requirements and equity backing rules. 125 For private equity companies, trading companies, production companies, 120 To the interdependence of financial resources and equity, see supra companies operating out of own or out of leased premises, companies which outsource certain functions and companies which do not, etc. different rules must apply. Both assets and liabilities are too heterogeneous -ranging from fixed assets such as real estate and activated research costs to current assets such as trade creditors with different credit rankings. The broad range of commercial activities in the real economy leads to countless risks which have to be assessed individually in view of the definition of provisions. In contrast, the balance sheets of different banks and different insurance companies are comparable and similarly structured, which makes it easier to define equity-related rules for specifically defined asset categories and the equivalent equity backing. This is simply not possible in the non-financial sector.
The regulations on capital in the financial sector are rules which need to be enforced by governmental financial market supervision. 126 These rules need a regulator who supervises the market and who reacts quickly if rules are broken. A financial market type set of rules regarding capital for the non-financial market sector would not only be much more complex due to the heterogeneity of the real economy but would be impossible to enforce unless society would be ready and willing to impose a financial market regulator to the rest of the economy. This is not an option. Therefore, we -firstly -can conclude, that the different legislative approach to equity or capital regulation in the financial and non-financial sector can be explained by practical reasons. A financial market-type equity regulation for the rest of the economy is unthinkable. 
Bank Failures damage the economy
It is said that the collapse of a bank causes larger collateral damage to the rest of the economy than the bankruptcy of an enterprise operating in the non-financial market. 128 In general terms, this increased importance of the financial sector, as it relates to the overall economy, is correct. The bankruptcy of a bank does cause more damage to the economy than the bankruptcy of a production company or another non-financial market company of the same size.
129
Nevertheless, the recent past has shown, that there are also non-financial sector companies that are deemed by their governments as too big to fail 130 -and which were consequently supported by the respective governments. The too big to fail argument therefore does not alone justify different equity regulation in the financial market. 
5.
How to regulate equity in the non-financial sector?
Equity discussion focuses on the legal capital
The academic discussion in Europe regarding equity largely concerns capital protection or distribution restrictions 132 and whether minimal capital requirements should be made for the legal capital. 133 The problem with this discussion is that it relates the concept of equity to rules on minimal capital requirements. 134 It is indeed easy to attack the concept of equity under this premise, since the formal rules regarding the minimal capital allow for grossly undercapitalized companies, in which the formal capital-and creditor-protection rules just do not work. Statements such as '[l]egal capital rules are a form of primitive regulatory technology' 135 as they are linked to minimal non flexible capital requirements are the result of this shortcoming. 136 On the other hand, we see the Rickford-concept, which works in a world of perfect accounting and perfectly adjustable creditors. 137 It looks like a conflict between the Anglo-Saxon ideas of self-responsibility and the German virtues of cooperation. 138 The discussion seems to have come to a halt; the term "battle line" when used to describe the current status of this discussion is to the point and illustrates the impasse: "In the legal capital discussion, there are good points on both sides; … But if this is so, why should the member states be forced to use the same legal capital standard? If there is reasonable disagreement on the pros and cons, why should a country not be allowed to have its own way and experiment with it". 
"Real-economy"-analogous rules on the equity requirements in the financial sector
The first question we have to look at is whether the rules on legal capital are analogous in their function to the quantitative and qualitative rules on equity in the financial sector. 140 This is to be rejected as the legal-capital rules do not relate to the financial resources needed for a specific company. "Legal capital and the maintenance of capital have been falsely assumed to 134 Cf. Armour (fn. be analogous to the function of the capital adequacy rules imposed to the banks and other financial intermediaries." 141 The unique quality of the equity-rules for the financial sector is that they relate to the size and the risk-structure of the company, 142 which is not the case with rules on legal capital. So, if the rules on the minimal legal-capital are not the "real-economy"-analogous to the equity requirements in the financial sector, which rules are?
If we analyse the rules on capital requirements in the financial sector we can see that these rules apply a more general principle -that principle being that the determination of the quantitative and qualitative amount of equity should be based on the risks of asset valuation and the liquidity risks. 143 Or, in other words, that the assets of a bank need to be of a quantity and a quality which would be sufficient to pay back the debts, in particular the deposits. Equityrules in the financial sector thus also address the amount and the quality of the assets held.
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"Real-economy" rules, analogous to the equity requirements in the financial sector, should do the same: address the quantity and quality of the assets in view of the risk profile of the company.
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The complexity and the heterogeneity of the assets held by companies of the real economy do not allow a direct analogy of financial sector type equity rules. 146 This means that substantive rules on equity requirements for the real economy should be general, not specific. They should apply the principle that the assets of a company need to be of a quantity and a quality which would be sufficient to pay back the debts in consideration of the specific risk-profile of the company. Therefore the answer to the question of whether the rules on equity of the financial sector can be applied in the real economy depends on the action taken: the answer is 141 Cf. yes if we reduce the rules to the general principle (relation between company risk and equity); but no, if we try to apply them directly. As a next step, the application of this principle of equity as a risk reserve to the real economy must be considered.
Equity (Assets) and its relation to the risk-behaviour of a company
Equity is the difference-amount between the debts and the assets of the company. It includes not only the legal capital of the company but also the legal and the accounting reserves, the hidden reserves 147 and the accrued profits and the free reserves which can be distributed to shareholders.
148 Therefore the quality of the equity is also defined by the quality of the assets held. Further, there is a link between the quantity and the quality of the assets and the riskbearing ability of the company. The risk-behaviour has the potential to reduce the assets; if the venture in which the assets were invested fails, more assets are needed to allow the company to fulfill its obligations.
The relation between the assets of a company and its risk-bearing ability is widely acknowl- 
Self-regulated or binding rules on equity
It is argued, that it is up to the private sector to regulate its risks and to act accordingly and that it is not the concern of governments to control equity in the non-financial sector -there is no respective public interest and private creditors should take responsibility. 155 For this reason there is no justification for strict financial-market type equity rules. But even those who plead for self-responsibility accept a liability of directors if these violate rules regarding the protection of creditors in the vicinity of a bankruptcy. 156 The absence of a state regulatory enforcement system on equity does not mean the absence of rules.
Equity rules in connection with the duty of directors
Further, discussions in the literature on the relation between the equity and the risk-behavior of a company also concern the rules regarding the duties of the board of directors. 157 These rules relate the risk bearing ability of the company (also) to the financial risk bearing ability, and thus to the equity of the company: "As far as strategic business decisions are concerned, therefore, creditors are de facto protected by the directors' shareholder-regarding duties, so long as the company has significant shareholder funds." 158 Davies, in particular, emphasizes this relation when he relates the duties of the board of directors to the equity of the company, by saying that rules on the duties of directors in the vicinity of a bankruptcy may reduce shareholders incentives to incorporate with inadequate capital, even if the formal legal capital requirements are met. 159 "Among the duties defined by the business judgment rule is the rule that no excessive risks can be taken." 160 "The duty requires directors, at a time when the company is in some form of financial distress, to take account the interests of the company's creditors." 161 These quotes show that there is a legally relevant relation between the financial risk bearing ability and the equity of the company 162 : Be it as a general duty of directors 163 or as a specific duty of directors towards creditors in the vicinity of insolvency 164 , under both systems directors are obliged to monitor the risk bearing ability of the company and to act accordingly. In a next step this principle has to be applied to define a set of rules regarding the equity requirements in the real economy. The board of directors is required to conduct a risk assessment when following the ISA 315 168 rules, but such a requirement can also be based on general rules regarding the duties of the board of directors. 169 This risk assessment is particularly significant as it not only defines the risks but also values them. As a consequence risk assessments should address the probability and the effect of each risk and define a figure which qualifies the consolidated risk: for functional risk management the board or the management must identify business risks, estimate the significance of these risks, asses the likelihood of their occurrence and decide on action to address those risk.
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Accounting-rules relevant risks: reserves, depreciation, provisions
The risk assessment may reveal risks which may then require direct revaluations, the impairment of assets and the formation of reserves and provisions based on applicable accounting rules. For example, if the management realizes that the risk factor in a DCF valued asset no longer depicts the risks properly, the risk factor would have to be increased which would in turn lead to a devaluation of that asset. 171 This reduces the nominal equity. Often the revaluation due to its lower valuation also reduces the revaluation risk. Ideally the reduction of the book value and the reduction of the valuation risk are parallel. If the accounting rules allow, the devaluation could go beyond the present value, thus creating hidden reserves. 172 Some of the risks addressed in the risk assessment concern risks deriving from past events which may lead to future liabilities. IAS 37.10 defines a 'provision' 173 as a liability of uncertain timing or uncertain amount. Such provisions must be made if the obligation has arisen due to a past event, if the probability of payment is more than 50 per cent and the amount can be estimated 170 Also cf. ISA 315.15 a-c. 'If the entity has established such a process (referred to hereafter as the "entity's risk assessment process"), the auditor shall obtain an understanding of it, and the results thereof. If the auditor identifies risks of material misstatement that management failed to identify, the auditor shall evaluate whether there was an underlying risk of a kind that the auditor expects would have been identified by the entity's risk assessment process. If there is such a risk, the auditor shall obtain an understanding of why that process failed to identify it, and evaluate whether the process is appropriate to its circumstances or determine if there is a significant deficiency in internal control with regard to the entity's risk assessment process.' (ISA 315.16)'If the entity has not established such a process or has an ad hoc process, the auditor shall discuss with management whether business risks relevant to financial reporting objectives have been identified and how they have been addressed. The auditor shall evaluate whether the absence of a documented risk assessment process is appropriate in the circumstances, or determine whether it represents a significant deficiency in internal control. Many accounting rules and the Fourth European Company Law Directive for private companies 177 require the creation of a specific revaluation surplus as additional (first tier) equity whenever assets are valued above their purchase price or production costs. 178 Consequently the revaluation of the asset does not increase the distributable profit. 179 The 
Further risks which are not controlled by accounting rules
Other risks which cannot be controlled by accounting rules 181 have to be controlled by equity.
The procedure to define the equity is a combination of risk assessment and the application of accounting rules. 
6.5
Corporate Governance rules and the determination of equity, role of the shareholder Equity can be defined as the shareholders stake in the company. 183 Equity comprises the funds which the principal entrusted to the agent. 184 It is the shareholder's decision as to how much equity it wants to entrust to the company. This means that the shareholder has the competence to define the two factors which relate directly to equity: first, the amount and structure of the equity itself; and second, the risk bearing profile of the company. This separation of power between the shareholders (in the assembly of shareholders) and the board can also be derived from the more general principal agent rule: the principal gives funds to the agent and defines the risk behaviour related to the management of these funds. Outside of corporate law, this division of power between principal and agent is undisputed (e.g. it is up to the bankcustomer to define the risk profile of its financial investment).
For these reasons it is the shareholders who are the competent body within the company to define the equity and risk profile. They act either in reaction to motions of the board (regarding capital increases and decreases; distribution of dividends) or as founders of the company.
If the shareholders refuse to agree to the equity which the board needs in order to take the aspired risks, they are also, effectively, taking a decision regarding the (reduced) risk bearing ability of the company. As a consequence of this decision the company will not have the risk bearing ability needed to execute the aspired business. The board is therefore forced to adjust its risk profile or behaviour to the company's risk bearing ability. on the discretion of the board. Further, the reduction of first-tier equity requires a resolution of the shareholders and, in most pieces of legislation, a special audit report. 190 On the other hand, as long as the funds remain in the company and are not distributed to shareholders, it does not matter whether the accrued profits are high and the legal capital is low or the other way round. 191 To require the creation of first-tier equity only to cover all company risks would certainly reduce the flexibility of the board in the structuring the financing of the company. If the board would be required to create first-tier equity (e.g. legal capital) in the amount of the necessary risk-reserve, a default in complying with the rule would lead to a breach of duty by the board, even though there was only hypothetical damage. The time gap between the breach of duty and the occurrence of the damage can be lengthy, leading to the risk of a claim being time-barred, as well as making it difficult to provide evidence for the causality between the breach of duty and the damage. 192 Accordingly, the risk-based equity requirements can correctly be satisfied by both first-and second-tier equity equally. For creditors, the additional value of legal rules which would require the company to create first-tier equity based on the risk profile of the company is not sufficiently significant to compensate for the disadvantages of such a rule. Therefore the decision to form its risk-reserve with first or second tier capital should be left to the company. There is a general duty of the board of directors to respect the financial risk bearing ability of the company. 193 Therefore, the management and the board have to understand the valuation rules which have been applied, 194 and that the valuation of the assets depends on the assumed future prospects. As a general rule it can be said that the equity must be higher the more risks a company is taking. 195 It can only allow the business to proceed when the company has the financial resources to conduct such business. The board has to analyse the structure of the assets and determine whether the valuations are still correct considering new technical developments, changed market requirements and conditions, or financially unstable debtors who necessitate reserves for their possible bankruptcy. In as far as future cash and other income potentials are part of a true and fair valuation, the board and management have to assess if these assumptions regarding the future prospects are still accurate or if they have to be adjusted.
Further, financial control means that the board of directors and the management have to control the liquidity risk of the company. Similar to the banking sector, 196 a solvency-test can be used to verify the correctness of the real equity. Such an additional test can be especially helpful to the transparency of off-balance sheet risks, in particular the liquidity risk, and thus help to define the level of equity. 197 In this sense solvency-testing should not be used as a single regime in combination with a balance-sheet test to provide for creditor protection, but should rather be considered as an instrument to help to determine the adequate corporate equity in even a short term asset surplus requirement is too rigid for a company which is able to borrow.' A company is solvent when it holds sufficient high quality equity that can be turned into liquidity at any given time without suffering inadequate losses and can actually do so without exceeding its risk baring ability.
required to testify 206 that the equity which remains after the proposed dividend payment is still sufficient in view of the company's risk profile. Such an additional test has the potential to replace formal minimal-capital and formal capital protection rules.
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6.9 Enforcement of the rules on equity for the real economy
The sanction system for the non-compliance with equity requirements for the non-financial sector must take into account that the rules are more general, that a financial market type regulatory sanction system would be too complex and that the smaller impact of a company's failure to the general economy justifies a less extensive sanction system. The argument that there is no public interest in a system to control the equity of companies of the non-financial market sector 208 is correct. But the absence of a state regulatory enforcement system does not mean the absence of rules. As is the case with many other sectors, a sanction system has to be applied by private initiative. The same should apply if general rules on equity are violated.
The sanction system is a combination of liability and corporate governance rules with the possibility to litigate if somebody, for example a creditor in case of a bankruptcy suffers damage by the violation of rules.
In most jurisdictions liability rules are already in place if the company causes damage by pursuing excessive risks 209 . These management liability rules regulate not only the liabilityconsequences of a specific risk behaviour but also the aspired risk behaviour/profile and equity. In this sense they also define equity requirements for the non-financial sector. The norms are less precise as this is the case with the equity requirements for banks and for insurance companies but also more flexible and in particular they consider the various and heterogeneous situations in the real economy. They are not executed through regulatory execution by a public office but, indirectly, through the liability of the board who violates the equity-driven risk baring ability of its company.
7.
Conclusion: flexible rules on equity are to be preferred to strict rules on legal capital
It has been shown that the rules regarding the quantitative and qualitative capital-requirements for the financial sector cannot be simply transferred to the real economy. Financial market type capital regulation is not possible due to the heterogeneity of the real economy, and furthermore because there is no public interest in a financial-market type regulatory system. At last, one has to admit, that in the real economy formal rules on legal capital cannot compensate for financial market type capital regulation, because they do neither relate to the size nor to the risk-structure of the company. 210 They -at best -serve as an entry-barrier but cannot prevent grossly undercapitalized companies and thus damage to the creditors.
Yet as long as the funds remain in the company and are not distributed to shareholders, it does not matter whether the accrued profits are high and the legal capital is low or the other way round. 211 In both the financial sector and the real economy the important thing is equity, not so much the legal capital. For this reason, what is needed are not formal rules on legal capital, but flexible and self dependent rules on equity. If (only) the principles of capital regulation for the financial market are applied (and not the regulatory transformation) we come to rules which require equity levels to be set according to the risk profile of the company and the di-rectors to act accordingly. Solvency-and balance-sheet-testing are important tools to monitor the adequate level of equity. In order to formalize these tools, it could be worthwhile to discuss whether the management or auditor could be required to testify that the equity which remains after the proposed dividend payment is still sufficient in view of the company's risk profile.
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